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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)1 was 
enacted by Congress to “promote the interests of employees and their 
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans, and to protect contractually 
defined benefits.”2  While perhaps best known as the “pension reform 
law,” ERISA litigation for benefits under employee welfare plans now 
constitutes the largest category of ERISA litigation.3  For employees, 
the stakes in such litigation are high: denial of medical care, disability 
benefits, severance pay, accident and life insurance, and a variety of 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.   
1 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2000).  
Citation hereafter is to ERISA § numbers rather than to U.S.C. numbers.     
2 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113 (1989) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  “Employee benefit plans” include both 
pension and welfare plans.  ERISA § 1002(3).    
3 See John Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 
207, 208 (1990) (discussing how the Firestone decision is of great practical 
importance for employee welfare plans).     
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other contractual entitlements.4  Particularly in the area of disability 
benefits, employees – and indeed much of this country - depend upon 
private insurers to carry out the essential public function of ensuring 
that disability does not lead to poverty.5   
But the stakes for the companies sponsoring unfunded plans (i.e., 
plans that are not funded through the establishment of a trust), are also 
high, because whenever benefits are paid, the money comes directly 
out of the company’s own revenue.6  This profit motive creates a 
strong incentive for private insurers to cut costs by denying valid 
claims.7  It is easy to see, therefore, that where a company sponsoring 
an unfunded plan is also empowered to administer and thus make 
claims decisions under the plan, the company is faced with an inherent 
conflict of interest in approving or denying a given claim.8   
This Comment will focus on how, in defiance of the Supreme 
Court’s dictate in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, and contrary 
to the wisdom of nearly every other circuit court of appeals, the 
Seventh Circuit has failed to account for this conflict of interest when 
formulating its standard of review.  Part I of this Article examines the 
background and legal basis of the Firestone decision.  Part II follows 
                                                 
4 ERISA broadly defines “employee welfare plan[s]” or “welfare plan[s]” to 
include any “plan, fund or program which …was established or is maintained for the 
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, though the purchase of 
insurance or otherwise, (A) medical surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits 
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacations 
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship 
funds, or prepaid legal services….”  ERISA § 1002(J) (2000).   
5 See Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Insur. Co. of Am., 321 F. Supp. 2d 226, 
240 (D. Mass. 2004).   
6 Although ERISA requires employers to fund employee pension plans through 
the establishment of a trust or through the purchase of insurance, the statute 
specifically exempts employee welfare plans from these funding requirements.  
ERISA § 1081(a)(1).   
7 See Radford, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 240. 
8 The ERISA statute itself gives rise to this conflict by providing that 
employers may appoint their own officers to administer ERISA plans even if the 
company is a “party in interest,” in conjunction with exempting employee welfare 
plans from its funding requirements.  ERISA § 1108(c)(3) (2000).      
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the Seventh Circuit’s evolution towards its current approach to the 
conflict of interest issue, with a focus on how its standard solidified in 
the past year.  Part III critiques the various rationales offered by the 
Seventh Circuit in support of its decisions, and Part IV suggests how 
an inherent conflict of interest should be acknowledged and taken into 
account by reviewing courts.    
 
I. The Supreme Court Addresses the Question Left Open by ERISA: 
What is the Applicable Standard of Review for Claims 
Determinations?   
 
The ERISA statute affords every participant and beneficiary of 
employee benefit plans the right to bring suit “to recover benefits due 
to him under the terms of the plan, to enforce his rights under the 
terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the 
terms of the plan.”9  The ERISA statute further specifies that in 
accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee plan 
shall: 
(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant 
or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan 
has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for 
the denial, written in a manner calculated to be 
understood by the participant, and 
  
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant 
whose claim for benefits has been denied for a full and 
fair review by the appropriate named fiduciary of the 
decision denying the claim.10
 
Notably absent from the statute, however, is any indication as to what 
standard of review courts should use when reviewing the decision of a 
plan administrator to deny benefits.11  Instead, the courts were 
                                                 
9 ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000).   
10 ERISA § 1133 (2000).   
11  Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109.   
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instructed to develop a “federal common law of rights and obligations 
under ERISA-regulated plans.”12   
By the late 1980s, the overwhelming majority of courts, including 
the Seventh Circuit, were using the extremely deferential “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard of review.13  The courts differed greatly, 
however, as to how to apply the standard in cases where there is a 
conflict.14  In 1989, the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari to 
provide guidance on this important issue.15   
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, a group of plaintiffs 
sued their employer for wrongfully terminating benefits under an 
unfunded plan.16  Applying the labor law “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard, the district court upheld the employer’s decision to deny 
benefits.17  The Third Circuit reversed, finding that de novo review is 
the proper standard where the employer is both the fiduciary and 
administrator of an unfunded plan.18  The court held that “[t]he 
                                                 
12 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).   
13 Kathryn Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim 
Cases, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1083, 1109-119 (2001).  For the purposes of this 
Comment, the terms “deferential review,” “arbitrary and capricious,” and “abuse of 
discretion” will be used interchangeably.  Most courts find that these terms are a 
“distinction without a difference.”  Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 
818 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Cox v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 572 
n.3 (8th Cir. 1992)).  Courts adopted this standard from 29 U.S.C. § 186(c), a 
provision of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.  Firestone, 489 U.S. at 
109.  The Seventh Circuit will uphold a plan administrator’s decision under the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard as long as: (1) “it is possible to offer a reasoned 
explanation, based on the evidence, for a particular outcome,” (2) the decision “is 
based on a reasonable explanation of relevant plan documents,” or (3) the 
administrator “has based its decision on a consideration of the relevant factors that 
encompass the important aspects of the problem.”  Exbom v. Central States, 
Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund, 900 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 
(7th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).   
14 See Kennedy, supra note 13. at 1110 n.141.  (collecting cases).    
15 Firestone, 489 U.S. 101 at 108.   
16 Id. at 105. 
17 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 640 F.Supp. 519, 522 (E.D. Pa. 
1986).  
18 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 828 F.2d 134, 145 (3rd Cir. 1987).   
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principles of trust law instruct that when a trustee is thought to have 
acted in his own interest and contrary to the interest of the 
beneficiaries, his decisions are to be scrutinized with the greatest 
possible care.”19
Affirming the specific holding of the lower court, the Supreme 
Court held that the standard of review is de novo, “unless the benefit 
plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to 
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the 
plan.”20  Explaining the standard, the Court stated that “[t]rust 
principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate when a 
trustee exercises discretionary powers.”21  In so doing, the Supreme 
Court adopted a significantly different rationale than the Third Circuit, 
focusing on whether the plan administrator retained discretionary 
powers, rather than whether the plan administrator was impartial.22  As 
a result of this holding, plan sponsors simply needed to add boilerplate 
language to its policies conferring discretion to secure deferential 
review by the courts.23  As many legal scholars predicted, companies 
quickly seized upon this opportunity.24           
                                                 
19 Id. at 145.   
20 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 111.   
21 Id.  A discussion of how the Firestone decision misapplied trust principles is 
outside the scope of this Comment; however, much commentary has already been 
devoted to this topic.  See e.g., John Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 208 (1990) (noting that unfunded plans are different in a 
crucial respect from other trusts: there is no neutral fiduciary in ERISA plans, 
because the employer “has continuing economic interests in the plans that it 
sponsors.”); Donald Bogan, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 629 (2004), ERISA: Re-
Thinking Firestone in light of great-west—implications for standard of review and 
the right to a jury trial in welfare benefit claims, (“[F]ederal courts continue to 
overlook the fundamental premise that unfunded and insured ERISA plans are not 
trusts.”)   
22 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.   
23 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) enacted 
Model Act #42, which prohibits these sorts of discretionary clauses in health and 
disability policies.  To date, Illinois and California have both adopted this law.  29 
Ill. Reg. 10172 (July 15, 2005); California Insurance Code § 10291.5(f).  As one 
commenter noted, states that adopt Model Act #42 “significantly assist ERISA plan 
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But even in situations where a company has reserved such 
discretion, Firestone left open the possibility that conflict or bias could 
affect the standard of review.25  The Court stated in dicta that while a 
deferential standard of review is appropriate when a trustee exercises 
discretionary powers, “if a benefit plan gives discretion to an 
administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, 
that conflict must be weighed as a ‘factor in determining whether there 
is an abuse of discretion.’”26   
Courts have taken a variety of different approaches to giving 
effect to this statement in the context of unfunded plans.27  As the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals aptly noted in Pinto v. Reliance 
Standard Insurance Co., “[s]ince Firestone, courts have struggled to 
give effect to this delphic statement, and to determine both what 
constitutes a conflict of interest and how a conflict should affect the 
scrutiny of an administrator’s decision to deny benefits.”28  Of all the 
circuit courts of appeals, the Seventh Circuit has distinguished itself 
by refusing to both acknowledge that a significant inherent conflict 
exists, and in turn provide for an adjusted standard of review when 
such a conflict is shown.29
                                                                                                                   
participants in gaining an equal footing with ERISA plan insueres in disputes arising 
from insured ERISA benefits plans.”  Bogan, supra note 21, at 740.      
24 See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383 n.2 (3rd Cir. 
2000) (remarking that Professor Langbein, in his article, supra note 21 at 217, 
accurately predicted that plan sponsors would quickly add grants of discretion to 
their plans and that “problems of how courts should deal with conflicted fiduciaries 
would resurface”).   
25 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.    
26 Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 187, cmt. d (1959)) (emphasis 
added). 
27 See infra Section IV, discussing these various approaches.   
28 Pinto, 214 F.3d at 383.  Interestingly, the author of Pinto, Judge Becker, also 
authored the Third Circuit’s decision in Firestone.          
29 See Mers v. Marriott Int’l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment 
Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that an insurance company who 
pays benefits out of its own assets and interprets its own policies has a “potential” 
conflict, but that this “is not enough to show an actual bias” worthy of adjusting the 
standard of review).  In more recent cases, the Seventh Circuit has arguably 
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II. The Evolution of the Seventh Circuit’s Standard of  
Review for Conflicts 
 
Although a complete survey of the Seventh Circuit’s decisions 
regarding plan administrator conflict of interest is beyond the scope of 
this Comment, the following cases were all instrumental in the 
development of how the court recognizes (or fails to recognize) a 
conflict of interest.  With the exception of the Van Boxel decision 
discussed below, the following cases all involve unfunded plans in 
which either the employer or insurer also administers the plan, thus 
giving rise to the conflict of interest.     
 
A. Pre-Firestone: Judge Posner’s Influential Van Boxel v. Journal 
Company Employees Pension Trust Decision 
 
The plaintiffs in Van Boxel v. The Journal Company Employees’ 
Pension Trust, directly challenged the district court’s use of the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.30  Although ultimately 
rejecting the challenge, the court stated in an opinion by Judge Richard 
Posner, that “[w]e are not entirely unsympathetic to the challenge, and 
notice that although the weight of authority is against him there is 
                                                                                                                   
acknowledged - at least on a semantic basis - that there is some sort conflict.  See, 
e.g., Rud v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Am., 438 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(“There is no contract the parties to which do not have a conflict of interest in the 
same severely attenuated sense, because each party wants to get as much out of the 
contract as possible.”); Hess v. Reg-Ellen Machine Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 660 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“we have repeatedly rejected arguments for a heightened standard of 
review solely because a corporation or insurer interprets its on plan to deny 
benefits.”).    
30 836 F.2d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 1987).  The plaintiff in this case challenged 
the decision of the Company’s pension trust fund to reject his claim for a pension.  
Id.    Although this pension plan was funded, the court noted that there is still an 
issue whether the plan is “adequately funded,” noting ERISA’s exemption of certain 
benefit plans from its funding requirements.  Id.  at 1050-1051.  Thus, the concerns 
over neutrality on the part of plan administrators discussed in this decision have 
equal, if not more, force in the context of unfunded plans.      
158 
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growing skepticism about the orthodox approach.”31  Notably, the 
court cited the Third Circuit’s Firestone decision as one example of 
such skepticism.32  The court also noted that although the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard is used in the administrative law context, 
ERISA plans are easily distinguishable because the administrators of 
such plans are not operating under a broad grant of delegated power.33   
Without committing to one specific approach, Judge Posner 
ultimately employed a law and economics rationale for applying some 
form of deferential, rather than de novo review.34  He reasoned that the 
impact on a company’s welfare of granting or denying an individual 
application for benefits “will usually be too slight” to compromise the 
impartiality of the administrators, even if they are all associated with 
the company.35  For example, a corporation which generates annual 
revenues of six billion dollars is not likely to flinch at paying out 
$240,000 on one claim.36  Judge Posner also noted that dealing fairly 
with claims is in the company’s “long-run best interest” because if 
claims are treated unfairly, because employees will in turn demand 
                                                 
31 Id. at 1049.   
32 Id.     
33 Id.  at 1050; see generally, Mark DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse of 
Administrative Law in ERISA Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727 (2004) 
(discussing the myriad of ways that administrative law principles have been 
improperly imported to the ERISA context).   
34 Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1051-52.  The Seventh Circuit gave the “law and 
economics” label to this approach in subsequent cases.  See e.g., Mers v. Marriott 
Int’l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th 
Cir. 1998) (“we have rejected the theory that an inherent conflict is sufficient to alter 
the standard of review by applying a law-and-economics rationale to establish that 
no conflict exists.”).   As Judge Posner has explained in other writings, the purpose 
of applying economic analysis to the law “is to construct and test models of human 
behavior for the purpose of predicting and (where appropriate) controlling that 
behavior.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 15-16 (Harvard University 
Press 2002) (1995).  While not an infallible calculator, the individual imagined by 
this approach is assumed to pursue goals in a “forward-looking fashion by 
comparing the opportunities open to him at the moment he must choose.”  Id.    
35 Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1051.     
36 This is the example used in Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 
1344 (7th Cir. 1995), a case that relied on Van Boxel’s law and economics rationale.   
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higher wages.37  This is all assuming, of course, that the employee is 
“rational and well informed.”38        
Notably, however, Judge Posner explicitly acknowledged the 
limitations of this rationale, stating: 
 
pension rights are too important these days for most 
employees to want to place them at the mercy of a 
biased tribunal subject only to a narrow form of  
“arbitrary and capricious” review, relying on the 
company’s interest in its reputation to prevent it from 
acting on its bias.  Nor is it clear that the contractual 
perspective is the correct one in which to view claims 
under ERISA.  A congress committed to the principles 
of freedom of contract would not have enacted a statute 
that interferes with pension arrangements voluntarily 
agreed on by employers and employees.  ERISA is 
paternalistic; and it seems incongruous therefore to 
deny disappointed pension claimants a meaningful 
degree of judicial review on the theory that they might 
be said to have implicitly waived it.39    
 
Judge Posner then discussed how several courts do not apply the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard of review where the presumption 
of neutrality fails, ultimately proposing a “sliding scale” approach 
within the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review framework.40  
Under this rule, reviewing courts are allowed to “make the necessary 
adjustments for possible bias in the trustees’ decision.”41  The court 
did not, however, ultimately determine whether a conflict of interest 
                                                 
37 Van Boxel, 836 F.2d at 1051.      
38 Id.         
39 Id. at 1052.    
40 Id.       
41 Id. at 1053.   
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was present in this case, finding that the decision of the trustee was 
“clearly” reasonable.42    
 
B. Post-Firestone Decisions: 1995 to 2004.   
 
In Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., the Seventh Circuit again 
invoked the law and economics rationale articulated in Van Boxel, but 
gave the first of many indications that the drawbacks of the approach 
would not have much bearing on the standard of review applied.43  
Chalmers involved an employee’s claim for benefits under a severance 
program, after being discharged for violating Quaker’s sexual 
harassment policy.44  Although Chalmers admitted to violating the 
policy, he argued that his conduct fell short of a Title VII claim, and 
that therefore, he was still entitled to benefits under Quaker’s 
severance program.45  Chalmers further argued that the court’s 
deference to Quaker’s decision should be limited because the officers 
of Quaker who served on the committee that makes benefits decisions 
had an inherent conflict of interest by both administering and funding 
the plan.46   
Rejecting these challenges, the court first noted that ERISA 
specifically endorses the notion of a corporate officer who doubles as 
a plan administrator.47  Noting its previous decision in Van Boxel, the 
court also held that rejecting Chalmer’s claim would have little effect 
on the company’s bottom line and that denying meritorious claims 
would be a poor business decision.48  In so doing, the court reaffirmed 
its stance that the structure of an unfunded plan merely constitutes a 
                                                 
42  Id.     
43 Id. at 1344.   
44 Id. at 1342.   
45 Id. at 1343-45.     
46 Id. at 1344.   
47 Id. (citing ERISA § 1108(c)(3), which allows employers to appoint their own 
officers to administer ERSIA plans even if the company is a “party in interest.”).   
48 Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995).      
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“potential” conflict; not an actual or inherent one.49  Such “potential” 
conflicts, therefore, do not justify a court engaging in any closer 
scrutiny of the plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits.50             
In Mers v. Marriott International Group Accidental Death and 
Dismemberment Plan, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s 
presumption that the insurer was operating under an inherent conflict 
of interest by serving as the plan insurer and administrator.51  
Reversing the district court’s decision, the Seventh Circuit adopted 
precisely the opposite presumption: “that a fiduciary is acting neutrally 
unless a claimant shows by specific evidence of actual bias that there 
is a significant conflict.”52  The court did not, however, elaborate upon 
what evidence would be required to show a “substantial conflict” or 
“actual bias.”  That the court adopted this presumption is significant, 
because in so doing, the court explicitly acknowledged – and then 
rejected - the approach taken by several other circuits.53    
The Seventh Circuit again rejected a district court’s attempt to 
“put a thumb on the scale” against the administrator of an unfunded 
plan, in Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehensive Disability 
Protection Plan.54  Affirming the rational used in Mers, the court 
stated that “it is unsound for the judiciary automatically to impute the 
plan administrator’s position to the person who decides on its behalf” 
because insurance companies “lack any stake in the outcome.”55  The 
court further reasoned that because the plaintiff did not ask the court to 
investigate a specific compensation and promotion scheme within the 
company, that “we have no reason to think the actual decision-makers 
at UNUM [the insurer] approached their task any differently than do 
                                                 
49 Id. at 1345.   
50 Id.     
51 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1997).   
52 Id. at 1020.   
53 Id. at 1021. (“While some courts have found that a denial of benefits is 
presumptively void and must be reviewed de novo where a similar conflict may 
exist, we have not.”) (internal citations omitted).   
54 195 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 1999).   
55 Id. at 981.   
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the decisionmakers at the Social Security Administration….”56  With 
this statement, the court continued its delineation of an extremely 
demanding burden on the claimant to prove bias (i.e., that the specific 
agents must have a stake in the outcome) and resurrected the 
administrative law analogy that the court specifically warned against 
in Van Boxel.57  The court also, as Judge Wood noted in her dissenting 
opinion, reversed the district court’s decision despite its commitment 
to addressing mixed questions of law and fact (such as conflicts) with 
a “light appellate touch.”58     
In Leipzig v. AIG Life Insurance Co., the court provided two 
additional rationales for not adjusting the standard of review.59  First, 
the court made an efficiency argument, noting that “this plan puts 
decisions in the hands of medical specialists (which federal judges and 
juries assuredly are not) and curtails the cost of litigation, which 
makes it possible to provide workers with better benefits on a given 
budget.”60  Second, the court set forth a freedom of contract argument, 
remarking that courts have no more authority to override a 
discretionary clause than they would to require benefits to be set at a 
higher percentage, or to change the definition of disability.61  Citing 
Mers, the court also articulated a rigid formulation of its “reputational 
incentives” rationale, stating that “[u]nless an insurer or plan 
administrator pays its staff more for denying claims than for granting 
them, the people who actually implement these systems are 
impartial.”62      
                                                 
56 Id.      
57 Id.  See also supra note 33.    
58 Id. at 986 (Wood, D., dissenting) (citing Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 
F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 1999)).  Judge Wood further stated that “[t]hus, while I do 
not mean to imply that this court must blindly follow a district court’s finding of a 
conflict, I think it inconsistent with our usual practice to dismiss the lower court’s 
conclusion without setting forth a powerful reason to do so.” Perlman, 195 F.3d at 
986.        
59 362 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2004). 
60 Id. at 408. 
61 Id.   
62 Id. at 409.   
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C. The Seventh Circuit Solidifies its Standard – 2005 to the Present 
 
The Seventh Circuit began 2005 by solidifying its commitment to 
denying plenary review in conflict cases.  In Shyman v. Unum Life 
Insurance Co., the court flatly rejected a plaintiff’s claim that a more 
searching review is necessary, stating that “the law of this circuit is 
otherwise.”63  Remarkably, however, the court nearly recognized a 
conflict in its Hess v. Reg-Ellen Machine Tool Corp. decision.64  At 
issue in Hess, was the plaintiffs’ attempt to roll their plan distribution 
into an IRA account of their choosing.65  Denying the claims, the 
administrator found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to diversify 
their stock until they were 55 years old, as required by a recent 
amendment to the plan.66  The plaintiffs challenged the decision, 
arguing not only that there was an inherent conflict of interest, but also 
a more “significant” bias because the employer actually lacked 
sufficient assets to grant their requests for diversification.67  This 
argument was bolstered by the employer’s concession that paying out 
the requested amount would “change the whole forecasting going 
forward” as far as what the plan could provide to other plan 
participants.68   
Given these extraordinary facts, the Seventh Circuit conceded that 
the Hesses’ claim of bias “has more teeth to it than similar claims that 
we have rejected in the past,” and stated that “we may perform a 
slightly ‘more penetrating review.’”69  The court was also careful to 
reiterate, however, that “we have repeatedly rejected arguments for a 
heightened standard of review solely because a corporation or insurer 
                                                 
63 427 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2005).   
64 423 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2005).   
65 Id. at 657.   
66 Id.   
67 Id. at 659.   
68 Id. at 659.   
69 Id. at 660.   
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interprets its own plan to deny benefits.”70  In the end, the court 
applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard and upheld the plan 
administrator’s decision without any trace of a more searching 
review.71        
The Hess case illustrates just how far the Seventh Circuit will go 
in rejecting conflict of interest arguments.  The fact that the court only 
stated that they “may perform a slightly more penetrating review” in 
light of the conceded conflict of interest, begs the question as to what 
kind of conflict a plaintiff would have to show in order to have any 
meaningful review.72  This question has yet to be answered by the 
court.   
In Semien v. Life Insurance Co. of N. America, the court added yet 
another obstacle to proving conflict: virtually no discovery.73  In 
Semien, the plaintiff argued that the review of a disability claim by 
non-examining physicians doctors did not constitute sufficient grounds 
to deny her claim.74  Noting its general disfavor of discovery in 
ERISA cases, the court held that claimants must make a prima facie 
showing of bias or show a “good faith basis to believe that limited 
discovery will produce such evidence.”75  An example of an 
acceptable prima facie showing would be where evidence is provided 
that the claimant’s application was not given a “genuine evaluation” – 
for example where there is evidence that the plan administrator did not 
do what it said it did, such as throwing an application in the trash 
                                                 
70 Id. at 659.   
71 Id. at 663.   
72 Id. at 660.   
73 436 F.3d 805, 814 (7th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed (April 28, 2006) 
(No. 04-3664). 
74 Brief for Petitioner, Semien v. Life Insur. Co. of N. Am. (No. 04-3664).   
75 Semien,  436 F.3d at 814.  (citing Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. 
Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 985 (7th Cir. 2000); see 
also, Perlman, 195 F.3d at 982.  (“[W]hen there can be no doubt that the application 
was given a genuine evaluation, judicial review is limited to the evidence that was 
submitted in support of the application for benefits….”).      
165 
14
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 10
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol1/iss1/10
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                    Volume 1, Issue 1                    Spring 2006 
rather than evaluating it on the merits.76  Thus, a smoking gun is 
essentially required.  Not surprisingly, the court found that because 
there was “no basis to believe that the physicians in this case did not 
conduct a full and fair evaluation of Semien’s condition,” the court 
denied her request for discovery.77   
Significantly, the court also offered a new rationale for refusing to 
question a plan administrator’s neutrality, stating:  
 
Congress has not provided Article III courts with the 
statutory authority, nor the judicial resources, to engage 
in a full review of the motivations behind every plan 
administrator’s discretionary decisions.  To engage in 
such review would usurp plan administrators’ 
discretionary authority and move towards a costly 
system….[that] would undermine one of the primary 
goals of the ERISA program: providing a method for 
workers and beneficiaries to resolve disputes over 
benefits inexpensively and expeditiously.78   
 
In so doing, the Semien court clarified that plaintiffs must not only 
make a prima facie showing of bias or conflict before adjusting the 
standard of review, but must do so without conducting any discovery 
to prove that a conflict actually exists, thus compounding the already 
difficult task of overcoming the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of 
review.79  The court also made clear that in the cost/benefit calculus, a 
claimant’s potential entitlement to benefits must cede to the plan 
sponsor’s interest in keeping costs down where discovery is required 
to prove the claim. 
 The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision, Rud v. Liberty Life 
Assurance Co. of Boston, provided a startling elaboration on the 
                                                 
76 Semien, 436 F.3d at 814 (citing Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. 
Comprehensive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2000)).       
77 Id.   
78 Id.  (internal quotes and cites omitted).   
79 See Id.   
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freedom of contract argument alluded to in Leipzig.80  In Rud, the 
court again questioned whether the insurer’s status and benefit payor 
and administrator created a conflict, stating that every contract has a 
conflict of interest in “the same severely attenuated sense” because 
“each party wants to get as much out of the contract as possible.”81 
The court reasoned that if an employer wishes to cut costs, lower 
wages and benefits would have been promised from the start; 
therefore, this is no need for employers to “steal” contracted-for 
benefits “through the back door” by denying meritorious claims.82  
The court then analogized to the Supreme Court cases upholding 
forum selection clauses, even though they are rarely read by the 
consumer, reasoning that overriding the terms of the benefits contract 
in this case would “destabilize” large reaches of contract law.83      
 
III. Why the Seventh Circuit’s Rationales for Refusing to Acknowledge 
an Inherent Conflict of Interest are Unsupportable. 
 
As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that the Seventh Circuit is 
one of only two84 courts of appeals that refuse to recognize an inherent 
conflict where the employer or insurer both funds and makes decisions 
                                                 
80 438 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006).       
81 Id. at 776.   
82 Id. 
83 Id.   
84 As of now, the Second Circuit does not recognize an inherent conflict; 
however, the court may be backing off from this view.  See Whitney v. Empire Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield, 106 F.3d 475 (2d Cir. 1997) (reasons not from effect but 
language, concluding that Firestone simply does not require anything but arbitrary 
and capricious review unless the plaintiff demonstrates how a conflict biased a 
fiduciary’s decision.); see also, Locher v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 389 F.3d 288, 296 
(2nd Cir. 2004) (“we do not conclude that a finding of a conflicted administrator, 
standing alone, can never constitute good cause. We need not address that possibility 
here, as it is not presented to us, but we note that it may be possible, in unforeseen 
circumstances, for good cause to rest entirely on the existence of a conflicted 
administrator.”).  As discussed in Section IV, however, unlike the Seventh Circuit, 
the Second Circuit grants de novo review after a conflict showing is made.    
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under the plan.85  Section A of this Part will discuss the Third Circuit’s 
critique of the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that reputational concerns 
and the bargaining power of employees protect against self-serving 
behavior on the part of a plan administrators.  Section B will discuss 
how the multistate investigation of UnumProvident provides, at the 
very least, one example of how a company may deny meritorious 
claims to reduce costs.  Part C will discuss why neither efficiency 
concerns nor a perceived lack of Article III court power justifies 
disallowing claimants discovery to prove a conflict of interest.               
  
A. The Third Circuit Critiques the Seventh Circuit’s “Overly  
 Optimistic” Law and Economics Approach to Conflicts.    
  
As described in Section II, the Seventh Circuit justifies its 
standard by claiming that the plan sponsor’s reputational interests in 
conjunction with the negotiating power of employees negate any 
incentive for plan administrators to deny valid claims.86  In Pinto v. 
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the Third Circuit directly 
addressed and convincingly refuted both of these assumptions.87   
To begin, the Third Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that 
reputational concerns may motivate employer/insurer behavior to 
some extent; however, the court ultimately concluded these concerns 
do not negate the plan administrator’s incentive to deny valid claims.88  
The court explained that because ERISA litigation generally arises 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Evans v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866, 876 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Fought v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1006 (10th Cir. 2004); Pinto v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 387 (3d Cir. 2000); Vega v. Nat’l 
Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 1999); Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. 
Co., 128 F.3d 1263 (8th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 
F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993); Brown v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 
1561 (11th Cir. 1990); Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan Sponsor Applied Remote 
Tech., Inc. 125 F.3d 794, 794 (9th Cir. 1997).       
86 See discussion supra Sections II(B)-(C).   
87 Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. of Am., 214 F.3d 377, 389 (3d Cir. 
2000).   
88 Id. at 388.   
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only in close cases, there is little incentive for an insurer to treat these 
borderline cases “with the level of attentiveness and solicitude that 
Congress imagined when it created ERISA ‘fiduciaries.’”89  Rather, 
insurance carriers have an active incentive to deny close claims in 
order to keep costs down so that companies will choose them as their 
insurers.90  Interestingly, this sentiment echoes what the Seventh 
Circuit itself has stated:  rights under a benefit plan are too important 
for most employees to rely on the “company’s interest in its reputation 
to prevent it from acting on its benefit.”91  As noted by the Pinto court, 
this economic consideration has unfortunately been since neglected by 
the Seventh Circuit.92
The Pinto court also recognized the problems underlying the 
Seventh Circuit’s assumptions regarding the bargaining power of 
employees, stating:  
 
while in a perfect world, employees might pressure 
their companies to switch from self-dealing insurers, 
there are likely to be problems of imperfect information 
and information flow.  Employees typically do not have 
access to information about claim-denying by insurance 
companies…so long as obviously meritorious claims 
are well-handled, it is unlikely that an insurance 
company’s business will suffer because of its client’s 
dissatisfaction.93
 
                                                 
89 Id.     
90 Id.     
91 See supra Section II(a), discussing Van Boxel.     
92 Id. at 388.  Judge Posner actually acknowledged the Third Circuit’s critique 
in the Rud v. Liberty Life opinion, but ultimately ignored the societal importance of 
employee benefits.  See 438 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that ERISA is 
subject to contract law because employers are not required to establish such plans)    
93 214 F.3d at 388; see also, Wright v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. Group 
Benefits Plan, 402 F.3d 67, 75 n.5 (1st Cir. 2005) (similarly acknowledging that 
other courts have rejected the Seventh Circuit’s market forces rationale).   
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This lack of information is particularly prevalent in many cases, where 
the claims for benefits occur after the individuals have left active 
employment and are seeking pension or disability benefits.94  
Similarly, access to information will also not likely be available where 
the company is dissolving or restructuring because the long-term 
relationship between the employer and employee is also dissolving. 95   
While criticizing the Seventh Circuit’s conclusions, the Pinto 
court did recognize that some assumptions about economic behavior 
are necessary.96  The assumptions made however, are “less 
exceptional” than those of the Seventh Circuit, which has an “overly 
optimistic view of the flow of information and sophistication of 
employees.”97  Indeed, even assuming a less devious view of plan 
administrators, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning still fails.  As the 
Fourth Circuit has observed, “even the most careful and sensitive 
fiduciary [when operating under a conflict of interest] may 
unconsciously favor its profit interest over the interests of the plan, 
leaving beneficiaries less protected than when the trustee acts without 
self-interest and solely for the benefit of the plan.”98
Moreover, as law and economics scholars have pointed out in 
other contexts, consumers cannot consider all dimensions of product 
quality because they generally have a limited ability to process 
complex information.99  This “bounded rationality” in the ERISA 
                                                 
94 Pinto, 214 F.3d at 388.   
95 Langbein, note 2 at 216; see also, Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Insur. 
Co. of Am., 321 F. Supp. 2d 226, 240 (D. Mass. 2004) (“the complexity of the 
insurance market and the imperfect information available to consumers make it 
difficult to determine whether an insurer is keeping costs down through legitimate or 
illegitimate means.”).    
96 Pinto, 214 F.3d at 388 (“We recognize that the preceding section involves 
implicit assumptions about economic behavior, but such assumptions have become 
necessary in the post-Firestone era as we, and other courts, must somehow 
determine when a conflict warrants close scrutiny.”). 
97 Id..   
98 Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 86-87 (4th Cir. 
1993). 
99 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality and Unconscionability: A behavioral 
Approach to Policing Form Contracts, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003).   
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context, means that employees do not have the bargaining power to 
meaningfully negotiate or bargain for plenary review by the courts.  It 
is for this reason that California and Illinois have prohibited 
discretionary clauses altogether, thus requiring both state and federal 
courts to review claims on a de novo basis.100   
 
 B. The UnumProvident Scandal: An Example of Where  
  the Seventh Circuit’s Rationale for Deferential Review Fails. 
 
In November 2004, UnumProvident (“Unum”) entered into a 
multistate settlement agreement, requiring Unum to pay a 15 million 
dollar fine, to reopen and review de novo over 200,000 previously 
denied claims, and to make significant changes to its claim review 
procedure and corporate governance.101  The multistate 
investigation102 leading up to the agreement identified several specific 
claim handling procedures of concern to the state regulators, including 
an excessive reliance on in-house medical staff to support the denial of 
benefits, unfair evaluation and interpretation of attending physician or 
independent medical examiner reports, failure to evaluate the totality 
of the claimant’s medical condition, and an inappropriate burden 
                                                 
100 See supra note 23, discussing the NAIC prohibition on discretionary 
clauses generally.  See also Mark D. DeBofsky, The Disability Insurance Industry’s 
Attack on California’s Consumer Protection Initiative, INSUR. F., INC., Feb.-March 
2006, discussing a recent lawsuit filed by several industry associations, challenging 
the California Commissioner’s ability to prohibit discretionary clauses.   
101 See UnumProvident Settlement Agreement, Exhibit D (Report of the 
Targeted Multistate Mark Conduct Investigation), available at: 
http://www.state.tn.us/commerce/insurance/unum/UnumSettlementTn.pdf.  (Nov. 
18, 2004).  
102 On September 2, 2003, the chief insurance regulators of Massachusetts, 
Tennessee, and Main (“the lead regulators”) called a multistate targeted market 
conduct examination to determine if Unum’s individual and group long term 
disability income claims procedures reflected “unfair claim settlement practices,” as 
defined by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”).  See 
UnumProvident Settlement Agreement, Exhibit D (Report of the Targeted Multistate 
Mark Conduct Investigation), available at: 
http://www.state.tn.us/commerce/insurance/unum/UnumSettlementTn.pdf.  (Nov. 
18, 2004).   
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placed on claimants to justify eligibility for benefits.103  These 
procedures have been called into question in several cases.    
In one such case, McSharry v. UnumProvident Corp., the court 
unearthed striking and telling evidence of bias in Unum’s claims 
handling procedures.104  McSharry involved a wrongful termination 
claim by Dr. Patrick McSharry, who worked as a staff physician in 
Unum’s claim department.105   Dr. McSharry alleged that Unum had a 
policy of requiring medical professionals to use only language in their 
reports supporting a denial of benefits, to evaluate claimants’ medical 
conditions in isolation rather in combination, and that the medical 
advisors were generally expected to render opinions about medical 
conditions outside of his or her specialty, without requesting review by 
a specialist.106  In another decision, Radford Trust v. First Unum Life 
Insurance Co. of America, the court collected cases where the courts 
have commented “unfavorably” on Unum’s conduct, including one 
court’s description of Unum’s behavior as “culpably abusive.”107     
Thus, it is clear that in at least one case, an insurer was not able to 
resist the temptation to cut costs by denying benefits, and that 
reputational interests do not always save a benefits provider from this 
temptation.  Indeed, it is hard to believe that Unum’s actions were 
unique and that other insurers – operating under the same motivation – 
did not act with the same self-interest.  It is arguably fair to say, 
                                                 
103 Press Release, Tennessee Department of Insurance, available at 
http://tennessee.gov/commerce/pdf/press/prsRls111804.pdf. (Nov. 18, 2004).   
104 237 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D. Tenn. 2002).   This case arose on the 
Defendant’s motion to remove the case to federal district court.  The court denied the 
motion, holding that the claims were completely preempted by ERISA, and that the 
action was properly removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(b) (2000).  Id. 
at 876.     
105 Id. at 876.   
106 Id. at 877-88.  Although Dr. McSharry attempted to follow these guidelines 
while still rendering truthful medical reports, he ultimately told his supervisors that 
he would not be able to participate in what he considered unethical and illegal 
practices.  Id. at 877.     
107 321 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 n.20 (rev’d on other grounds) (D. Mass. 2004), 
(citing Keller v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 90 Civ. 5718 (VLB), 1992 WL 
346343, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993)).   
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therefore, that the Third Circuit’s economic assumptions are “less 
exceptional” than those of the Seventh Circuit, and that there is an 
actual, readily apparent conflict; not just the mere potential for one.108  
The Unum investigation also shows that in order to protect an 
employee’s entitlement to benefits, the court must undertake some 
review of the quality and quantity of evidence, even where the insurer 
has retained discretion. 
  
 C. Neither Concerns over Efficiency nor the Power of Article III 
Courts Justify Disallowing Discovery to Prove a Conflict of Interest.  
 
For the reasons discussed above, an inherent conflict of interest 
should be recognized in cases where the plan sponsor both funds and 
makes eligibility determinations under the plan.  But even if the 
Seventh Circuit is unwilling to presume this conflict, claimants at the 
very least, should be allowed to prove a conflict by conducting 
discovery – as several circuit courts of appeals already permit.109  As 
per the Seventh Circuit’s recent Semien decision, however, such 
discovery is not permitted absent a smoking gun or extraordinary 
circumstances.110   
As discussed in Section II(C), the premise in support of this 
argument is that one of the primary goals of ERISA is to resolve 
disputes over benefits “inexpensively and expeditiously” and that 
providing a full review of the motivations behind claims decisions 
                                                 
108  Killian v. Healthsource Provident Administrators, 152 F.3d 514, 521 (6th 
Cir. 1998).   
109 See e.g., Evans v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866, 876 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Liston v. Unum Corp. Officer Severance Plan, 330 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2003); Zervos v. 
Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2001); Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000); Kergosien v. Ocean Energy, Inc., 390 F.3d 346, 
356 (5th Cir. 2004); Farley v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 147 F.3d 774 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Tremain v. Bell Industries, 196 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999); Moon v. 
American Home Assur. Co., 888 F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1989).   
110 See supra Section II(c), discussing when discovery is allowed.     
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would exceed the statutory authority provided by Congress.111  This 
Article III rationale is the driving force behind Plaintiff Semien’s 
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, appealing 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision.112  Indeed, after examining the purpose 
of the ERISA statute, the United States Constitution, and the 
Legislative history of ERISA, it is clear that Article III courts are 
empowered to allow discovery and that efficiency cannot justify 
giving claimants an important tool to prove their claim.   
To begin unraveling the Seventh Circuit’s rationale, it is 
instructive to look at the stated purpose behind the ERISA statute, 
which provides: 
 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to 
protect interstate commerce and the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their 
beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting 
to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other 
information with respect thereto, by establishing 
standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for 
fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing 
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the 
federal courts.113     
 
Nowhere does the stated purpose even hint at a desire to limit the 
authority of the federal courts.114  Indeed, Congress specifically 
empowered aggrieved individuals seeking employee benefits to bring 
a “civil action…to recover benefits due.”115  Nor does the legislative 
                                                 
111 Semien v. Life Insurance Co. of N. America, 436 F.3d 805, 815 (7th Cir. 
2006).   
112 The arguments in this section are borrowed heavily from Semien’s writ of 
certiorari, submitted by her attorney Mark DeBofsky.   
113 (emphasis added) 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).   
114 There is also quite obviously no “ERISA” exception in the text of Article II, 
Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which extends the judicial power to “all 
cases, in law and equity.”   
115 ERISA § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2006).   
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history of ERISA support the conclusion that one of the “primary 
goals” of ERISA is to resolve disputes over benefits inexpensively and 
expeditiously.  As one of ERISA’s main sponsors, Jacob Javits, 
explained, House conferees were opposed to an administrative dispute 
mechanism “on grounds it might be too costly to plans and a stimulant 
to frivolous benefit disputes, and at their insistence it was dropped in 
conference.”116   
Moreover, even if efficiency were one of ERISA’s goals – which 
it decidedly is not - there would still be no justification for denying 
claimants discovery.  As Professor Jay Conison convincingly stated: 
 
[E]ven if there were some basis for believing that the 
treatment of a benefit suit as an evidentiary proceeding 
would interfere with the ‘prompt resolution of claims 
by the fiduciary, the rationale would still fail.  For it to 
be plausible, one would have to add two premises: that 
‘prompt resolution of claims’ is something Congress 
intended for the protection of sponsors and fiduciaries; 
and that such protection of sponsors and fiduciaries is 
more important than protection of the participants’ right 
to receive benefits  due.  Merely to state these premises 
is to reveal their untenability.117     
 
These “untenable” premises are particularly clear given that the 
Supreme Court has stated that claimants should not fare worse under 
ERISA as they did before its enactment.118  Before ERISA’s 
enactment, claimants undoubtedly had a right to both discovery and an 
evidentiary hearing; taking away these rights, therefore, could not 
have been what Congress intended.119  As a practical matter, allowing 
discovery to prove the existence of a conflict is crucial – indeed, how 
                                                 
116 3 Legislative History of ERISA, n.4 at 4769.   
117 Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 57-60 
(1992).   
118 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989).   
119 See Semien’s petition for certiorari at 74 U.S.L.W. (April 28, 2006).   
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is a claimant to prove bias without the means of investigating the 
benefits provider?  The Supreme Court itself has stated that the 
physicians retained by benefits plans “may have an incentive to make 
a finding of ‘not disabled’ in order to save their employers money and 
preserve their own consulting arrangements.”120  Authoritative 
medical journals such as the New England Journal of Medicine have 
remarked that “ERISA plans have a financial incentive to deny 
care…without liability, there is nothing in the law to counterbalance 
the financial incentive to deny care.”121  Without discovery, however, 
this proposition can never be proven.  Accordingly, if the Seventh 
Circuit continues to refuse to acknowledge an inherent conflict of 
interest, the court should at the very least allow the claimants 
discovery to prove that a bias exists.         
 
IV. How Conflicts of Interest Should Affect the Standard of Review  
 
For the reasons stated in Section III, the Seventh Circuit should 
recognize that there is an inherent conflict where an insurance 
company both funds and administers an ERISA plan.  A separate and 
perhaps even more important issue, however, is how to incorporate 
this conflict into the deferential review mandated by Firestone.  The 
circuit courts have recognized essentially three approaches recognized 
approaches to dealing with conflict: de novo review, burden shifting, 
and the sliding scale.   First I will discuss why the de novo and burden 
shifting approaches are unsatisfactory, and then I will suggest that the 
Seventh Circuit adopt the sliding scale approach because it comports 
with Firestone’s mandate, and adequately addresses the concerns 
behind the conflict.       
 
 A. De Novo Review and Burden Shifting: Two Unsatisfactory 
Approaches. 
                                                 
120 Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 832 (2003).   
121 Wendy K. Mariner, What Recourse? — Liability for Managed-Care 
Decisions and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 343 New England 
Journal of Medicine 592, 595 (August 24, 2000).   
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Although remarkably stringent in requiring particular evidence 
that a conflict infected the decision-making process, the Second 
Circuit uses the de novo review standard once it credits such 
evidence.122  Thus, once a conflict is alleged, the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard becomes a two-pronged test: first, whether the 
administrator’s decision was reasonable; and second, whether the 
evidence shows that the administrator was in fact influenced by the 
conflict of interest.123  If the court determines that the decision was in 
fact affected by the conflict of interest, de novo review becomes the 
standard of review.124   
As desirable as de novo review may be in these cases, courts are 
currently bound by Firestone’s requirement that conflict be “a factor” 
within the “arbitrary and capricious” framework.  Thus, unless and 
until the Supreme Court revisits Firestone, a better approach would be 
for the Second Circuit to relax the plaintiff’s burden in showing a 
conflict, and then to use conflict as a factor under the “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard, either using the burden shifting or sliding scale 
approach.125
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits 
take a burden shifting (or “presumptively void”) approach.126  As 
articulated by the Eleventh Circuit, the approach first requires a 
showing of an inherent or “substantial” conflict of interest; once the 
conflict is shown, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to demonstrate that 
the conflict did not infect the benefit determination.127  To determine 
whether the conflict infected the denial process, the court examines 
                                                 
122 Sullivan v. LTV, 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir. 1996).   
123 Id. at 1255-56. 
124 Id.   
125 As the Third Circuit stated in Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 
“only the Supreme Court can undo the legacy of Firestone.”  214 F.3d 377, 393 (3d 
Cir. 2000).   
126 See e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.3d 1556 (11th Cir. 
1990); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co, 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995).   
127 Brown, 898 F.2d at 1556. 
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whether the decision was wrong from the perspective of de novo 
review.128       
Once the burden is shifted, the plan administrator can meet its 
burden by demonstrating a routine practice or by giving other 
plausible justifications for the decision; for example, by showing that 
the fiduciary was acting out of concern for other beneficiaries.129  If 
the plan administrator is successful in meeting this burden, the court 
characterizes the decision as being “wrong but apparently 
reasonable.”130  In so doing, the court seems to assume that the 
decision is wrong because of the bias, but presumed reliable under the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.131  If the administrator is 
unsuccessful in meeting its burden, the decision is then held arbitrary 
and capricious.132  This standard undoubtedly weighs heavily on the 
plan administrator to disprove that the denial was not tainted by a 
conflict of interest; therefore, while the burden-shifting approach 
purports not to be de novo, in practice, the two standards bear little 
difference.      
 
 B. The Sliding Scale: The Most Viable Approach 
 
The sliding scale approach, applied by the majority of courts, 
lessens the deference afforded to the plan administrator’s decision in 
proportion to the conflict of interest at issue.133  Notably and 
somewhat ironically, this is the approach advocated by the Seventh 
Circuit in Van Boxel, where the court set forth a sensible means to 
                                                 
128 Id. at 1566-67.   
129 See Id. at 1567.  (“Even a conflicted fiduciary should receive deference 
when it demonstrates that it is exercising discretion among choices which reasonably 
may be considered to be in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries.”)   
130 Id. at 1567.   
131 See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1160-1161 (2001).   
132 Brown, 898 F.3d at 1567. 
133 See, e.g., Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 
2004); Evans v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2006); Woo v. Deluxe 
Corp., 144 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir. 1998); Vega v. Nat’l Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 
287 (5th Cir. 1999).  
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adjust the standard of review, without adopting a de novo standard.  
The court stated: 
 
[F]lexibility in the scope of judicial review need not 
require a proliferation of different standards of review; 
the arbitrary and capricious standard may be a range, 
not a point.  There may be in effect a sliding scale of 
judicial review of trustees’ decisions.134  
 
But as discussed, the Seventh Circuit rarely if ever finds a conflict; 
therefore, this standard has not really been put to practice by the court.  
Other courts, however, have found this standard to be a satisfactory 
means of staying within Firestone while lessening deference afforded 
to administrators operating under a conflict.           
The Third Circuit recently adopted this approach in Pinto.  The 
court found that the standard allows each case to be examined on its 
facts, including the ability to take into consideration the sophistication 
of the parties, the information accessible to them, and the exact 
financial arrangement between the insurer and the party.135  Within 
this approach, the court is able to adhere to Firestone’s dictate that 
conflict must be considered a “factor,” rather than doing away with the 
deferential standard altogether.136  Thus, plan administrators are still 
given deference, but the deference is reduced to the extent needed to 
counteract any conflict.137  
The Tenth Circuit elaborated upon the sliding-scale standard 
employed by the Pinto court, in its Fought v. Unum Life Insurance Co. 
of America decision.138  In Fought, the court elaborated upon “just 
how much less deference” a reviewing court should afford to the 
                                                 
134 Van Boxel v. The Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 
1053 (7th Cir. 1987).   
135 Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392 (3d Cir. 2000).   
136 Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392.   
137 See Vega, 188 F.3d at 296.   
138 379 F.3d 997 (10th Cir. 2004).   
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decision of a conflicted administrator.139 The court held that where an 
inherent conflict exists, the plan administrator will bear the burden of 
proving the reasonableness of its decision, using the “arbitrary and 
capricious” framework.140  Although this standard uses “burden-
shifting” as a step in the sliding-scale review, the standard still differs 
from the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, by providing for a greater 
“slide” or burden depending on the conflict or conflicts at issue.141        
Like the burden shifting approach, the sliding-scale approach, 
may be fairly subject to the criticism that this is merely de novo 
review by another name.  As the Pinto court noted, there is something 
“intellectually dissatisfying, or at least discomforting” in having a 
heightened “arbitrary and capricious” standard.142  To be sure, once 
conflict becomes a factor to consider, the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard starts sounding like a form of intermediate scrutiny.143  But 
because only the Supreme Court can undo the “legacy” of Firestone, 
the sliding scale approach best accommodates using conflict as a 
factor within the “arbitrary and capricious” framework.144  
   
CONCLUSION 
 
The ERISA statute was enacted not only to protect employees’ 
expectations and ensuring that employees received promised benefits, 
                                                 
139 Id. at 1005. 
140 Id. at 1006.   
141 Id. at 1005-6.  In addition to the “inherent” conflict of interest discussed in 
this Comment, the Tenth Circuit provided for several other situations warranting 
heightened scrutiny, including where there is a serious procedural irregularity, the 
plan administrator’s performance reviews or level of compensation are linked to the 
denial of benefits, and where the provision of benefits has a significant economic 
impact on the company administering the plan. Id.   If one or more of these conflicts 
are shown, the court is required to “slide along the scale” and further reduce the 
deference afforded to the plan administrator’s decision.  Id. at 1007.       
142 Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392 (3rd Cir. 2000).    
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 393. 
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but also to foster the growth of private employee benefit plans.145  And 
to be sure, allowing plenary review of benefits determinations will to 
some extent increase an employer’s cost associated with providing 
such plans.146  But because of the importance of these benefits, and the 
employees’ expectation that benefits will be paid when they are due, 
the interests in cutting-costs cannot prevail.  The courts must not 
abdicate their duty under ERISA and Article III of the United States 
Constitution to provide a real, substantive check on potential abuses.     
That being said, there are essentially three ways that the conflict 
of interest issue can be resolved.  First, Congress could amend the 
ERISA statute to specifically provide that de novo review must always 
be used when the plan at issue is unfunded.  Alternatively, the 
Supreme Court could revisit Firestone and impose a similar 
requirement, or at least flesh out what constitutes a conflict and how 
that conflict must affect the standard of review.  But barring any action 
from Congress or the Supreme Court, plaintiffs suing for ERISA 
benefits in the district courts of the Seventh Circuit should continue to 
argue that unfunded plans give rise to an inherent conflict that must 
adjust the standard of review.  It is to be hoped that one day soon, the 
Seventh Circuit will finally acknowledge what every other circuit 






                                                 
145 See Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux: The Renaissance of Laissez-Faire 
Contract in the Federal Common Law of Employee Benefits, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 153 
(1995) (discussing the inherent tension between Congress’s aim of protecting 
benefits while maintaining employers’ economic prerogative over the labor force 
and costs associated with labor).   
146 Any increase in cost, however, may be de minimus.  According to a report 
issued on November 14, 2004 by Milliman, Inc., who was commissioned by 
America’s Health Insurance Plans, the effect that prohibiting discretionary clauses 
will have on cost will be around 3 to 4 percent due to anticipated higher incidences 
of litigation, higher cost per litigated claim, and lower claim recovery costs.    
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